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1
The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
Paul H. Edelman*
There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing 
among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should 
it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay, I will refute that 
claim, both normatively and positively.
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the area of social choice it is difficult to achieve a consensus on 
very much. Within the somewhat more restricted area of apply-
ing social choice to law (as well as political science) there has been 
one issue, though, for which a consensus has been achieved—when 
choosing among multiple alternatives, if there is one alternative that 
is preferred to every other alternative in a pairwise comparison, a so-
called Condorcet winner, then that alternative should be selected.
It is a little surprising that this position has come to dominate. 
The battle over this assertion is at least 300 years old, going back 
to arguments between Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de 
* Professor of Mathematics and Law, Vanderbilt University, paul.edelman 
@vanderbilt.edu. I would like to thank Ed Cheng, Saul Levmore, Rob Mikos, Suzanna 
Sherry, and Allan Wiseman for helpful comments.
 Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen, Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future 
Research, in B. Grofman and G. Owen, eds, Information Pooling and Group Deci-
sion Making: Proceedings of the Second University of California, Irvine Conference 
on Political Economy 97 (JAI 986); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority 
Decision-making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va L Rev 97, 995 (989); Maxwell 
Stearns and Todd Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law 03 
(West 2009).
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208 The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
Borda in late eighteenth-century France.2 The current preference 
for a Condorcet winner seems to be based on some combination of 
normative claims about democratic fairness as well positive claims 
about the stability of the choice. At any rate, “Scholars have identi-
fied the Condorcet criterion as an important benchmark in evaluat-
ing the decision-making competence of institutions.”3
But, as so often happens, while legal scholars have considered the 
matter settled, work of social choice scholars has shed quite a differ-
ent light on the merits of a Condorcet winner. The primary purpose 
of this article is to bring attention to these results and show how 
they undercut the accepted wisdom. Taken together, these develop-
ments cast considerable doubt on the assumption that the concept 
of the Condorcet winner has any explanatory power in analyzing the 
behavior of legislatures.
This essay will proceed as follows: In Section II I present the req-
uisite background and explain the political and legal significance of 
the Condorcet winner. In the next section, I will exhibit a large class 
of examples in which the Condorcet winner is, as a normative mat-
ter, likely not the best choice. These examples, which were origi-
nally developed by Saari5 and discussed at length by Balinski and 
Laraki,6 are constructed using Condorcet components, sets of prefer-
ences which cycle in pairwise majority voting.
Section IV raises a theoretical objection to the importance of the 
Condorcet winner. I will discuss a number of theoretical results 
which demonstrate that any social choice procedure that always 
selects a Condorcet winner, if one is available, necessarily fails to 
satisfy a number of consistency conditions. These consistency con-
ditions lead to, among other pathologies, the “no-show” paradox 
where voters can be worse off if they cast a ballot than if they fail to 
vote at all. I will argue that this paradox is particularly problematic 
in the context of a deliberative body such as Congress. Section V 
closes the essay with a brief conclusion.
2 George Szpiro, Numbers Rule: The Vexing Mathematics of Democracy, from 
Plato to the Present chs 5, 6 (Princeton 200).
3 Maxwell Stearns, An Introduction to Social Choice, in Daniel A. Farber and 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, eds, Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 
90 (Elgar 200).
 And many political scientists as well, to be fair.
5 D.G. Saari, Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting (Am Math-
ematical Socy 200).
6 Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki, Majority Judgment, Measuring Ranking, and 
Electing 7 (MIT 200).
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I I .  B A C K G R O U N D  A N D  L E G A L  C O N T E X T
In this section, I will introduce some basic terminology from social 
choice and introduce the idea of the Condorcet winner.7 Then I will 
discuss both the political and legal significance of the Condorcet 
winner.
The standard model of social choice assumes that a set of voters, 
which we will label {, 2, . . . , n} are confronted with a number of 
alternatives, which we will denote {A, B, . . . , C}. We will assume 
that each voter has a preference order over the alternatives. For 
example, we will indicate that voter  prefers A to both C and B, and 
prefers C to B, by saying that ’s preference order is A > C > B. For 
simplicity we will assume that every voter has strict preferences, 
that is, there are no ties among her preferences. A collection of vot-
ers and their preference lists will be called a profile. The central 
problem in social choice is preference aggregation—how to go from 
a profile to a single societal choice.8 A method that takes as input the 
individual preferences of the voters and outputs the societal choice 
will be called a social choice function.
A fundamental conundrum for social choice is the problem of 
cycling. For example, suppose we have the following profile:
8 B > C > A 
0 C > A > B 
6 A > B > C
where by 8: B > C > A I mean that there are eight voters with prefer-
ence B > C > A. With these preferences there is no clearly preferred 
alternative: fourteen of the twenty-four people have B > C, sixteen 
have A > B, and eighteen have C > A. Such a situation is known 
as a Condorcet cycle. Cyclic preferences raise the concern that any 
choice is unstable, that is, it can be subsequently replaced by a pre-
ferred one in a pairwise-majority vote.
Although the existence of Condorcet cycles has been known for 
centuries, it was only after the fundamental work of Arrow,9 and 
7 Readers who would like a more thorough introduction can see Wulf Gaertner, A 
Primer in Social Choice Theory (Oxford 2006).
8 Actually one might also ask to go from the profile to a single societal preference 
order instead of picking a single winner. While this may seem like an equivalent 
problem the connection between picking a societal winner and picking a societal 
order is very subtle. See H.P. Young, Optimal Ranking and Choice from Pairwise 
Comparisons, in Grofman and Owen, Condorcet Models at 3 (cited in note ).
9 Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed Yale 963).
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later that of Gibbard and Satterthwaite,0 that the scope of the chal-
lenge to democratic legitimacy became clear. The short version of 
this is that any reasonable method by which a legislature turns the 
preferences of its members into a decision is subject to manipula-
tion (for example, by agenda control or introduction of new alterna-
tives) or cycling.
There are many ways that one might aggregate the preferences 
of the voters. Since the fundamental work of Arrow, the approach 
to choosing among the various methods has been axiomatic. That 
is, one decides a priori what properties a method should satisfy and 
then see which methods exhibit the desirable properties. So, for 
example, one often requires that a method exhibit the Pareto prop-
erty: if every voter prefers A to B, then society should not pick B. 
Most of the common social choice methods satisfy this property, 
although not all of them. The fundamental insight of Arrow is that 
there are no social choice functions that are consistent with a par-
ticular small set of very natural properties.2
For this essay the property of particular interest is the Condorcet 
criterion. We call an alternative a Condorcet winner if it would beat 
every other alternative in a pairwise majority vote. That is, alterna-
tive A is a Condorcet winner if, given any other alternative X, more 
people prefer A to X than vice versa. It is important to note that a 
Condorcet winner may not exist, as is demonstrated by our earlier 
example. A social choice function is said to satisfy the Condorcet 
criterion if, whenever there is a Condorcet winner, the social choice 
function selects it as the winner. Such methods will be called Con-
dorcet consistent.
It has become an article of faith among legal academics (and some 
political scientists) that Condorcet-consistent methods are the most 
desirable ones in the context of political decision making.3 The Con-
dorcet criterion is viewed as the natural generalization of majority 
rule in the two-alternative context. Majority rule is attractive from 
both a normative and a positive standpoint, but it really can only 
0 A. Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes,  Econometrica 587 (973); M.A. 
Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Corre-
spondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 0 J Econ 
Theory  (975).
 In particular, the method of sequential pairs under a fixed ordering may select a 
Pareto inferior alternative. See Alan D. Taylor, Mathematics and Politics: Strategy, 
Voting, Power, and Proof  § 5.5 (Springer 995).
2 For one explicit statement (and there are many variations) see id at 25.
3 See the references cited in notes  and 3. See also Daniel B. Rodriguez, State 
Constitutional Failure, 20 U Ill L Rev 23, 253 (20); Jonathan Remy Nash, 
A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 Stan L 
Rev 75, 96 (2003).
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be applied when the choice is between alternatives for which there 
will always be a majority winner. If more alternatives are available 
then there will typically be no majority winner. If there is a Con-
dorcet winner then it might be considered “the majority will” even 
if it is not “the majority’s will,” a term reserved for a true major-
ity choice.5 It is this connection to “majority rule” that makes the 
Condorcet criterion so appealing. But like many appealing axioms, 
such as the Pareto axiom already referred to, there may be hidden 
problems that undermine its desirability.
If we are concerned about stability of legislative decisions we may 
also find the Condorcet winner a desirable choice. Since it beats 
every other alternative in a pairwise vote, it is difficult to destabi-
lize the selection once it has been made. More generally we might 
think that a rational legislature would structure its rules so that the 
choice of legislation would be Condorcet consistent. That at least 
would ensure avoidance of Condorcet cycles whenever it is possible 
to do so. Levmore has suggested that the procedural rules of Con-
gress do, in fact, have that effect.6 
The debate over how legislatures convert the preferences of its 
members into a single choice has implications for how courts should 
interpret statutes. One conclusion from Arrow’s theorem and related 
results might be that “legislative intent is an oxymoron because the 
relationship between the individual preferences of legislators and 
the collective product of the legislative body is not discoverable.”7 
“The whole idea that statutes have purposes or embody policies 
becomes quite problematic, since the content of the statute sim-
ply reflects the haphazard effect of strategic behavior and procedural 
rules.”8 As a consequence some judges have argued that it makes 
no sense to consider the intent of the statute and any interpretive 
issues should be decided solely on the basis of the written statute 
itself.
There are a number of responses to this conclusion, some within 
public choice itself,9 but one way to try and reclaim the idea of 
 Gerald Kramer, Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule, in J. Roland Pen-
nock and John W. Chapman, eds, Nomos XVIII: Due Process 268 (NYU 977).
5 This distinction between “the majority will” and “the majority’s will” strikes 
me as interesting and underexamined. A Condorcet winner beats all other alterna-
tives because of different majorities coalescing to defeat each alternative rather than 
a fixed majority that prefers one alternative to all others. 
6 Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U Chi L Rev 777, 78 (2005).
7 Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in 
Farber and O’Connell, eds, Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law at 
9, 39 (cited in note 3).
8 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice  (99).
9 For a good summary of these arguments, see id at 38. 
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legislative intent is to argue that legislative procedures should be, 
and are, Condorcet consistent. If we believed that the legislature 
always chooses a Condorcet winner when it is available, it would 
bolster our confidence that the institution is behaving as rationally 
as possible, given the theoretical constraints of Arrow’s theorem, 
and thus perhaps be more confident in identifying intent behind 
their legislative actions.
In this article I wish to cast doubt upon this method of reclaim-
ing legislative intent.20 In the next section I will illustrate why the 
Condorcet winner, when available, may not, as a normative matter, 
be the obviously correct choice among multiple alternatives. In the 
following selection I will show that even if we think the Condorcet 
winner should always be chosen there are severe disadvantages in-
herent in any procedure that would guarantee such an outcome. The 
result is to say that we should neither privilege the Condorcet win-
ner nor attempt to ensure its selection.
There have been other critiques of the Condorcet winner condi-
tion. There is the obvious concern that a Condorcet winner need 
not exist. Of course this concern goes back several hundred years. 
Another criticism is that the Condorcet winner does not take into 
account the intensity of preference.2 But none of the standard social 
choice procedures allow for this sort of accounting,22 and so the criti-
cisms I present are more general. 
I I I .  I S  T H E  C O N D O R C E T  W I N N E R  
T H E  B E S T  C H O I C E ?
In this section I will give an example to show that the Condorcet 
winner should not be the presumptive choice among multiple al-
ternatives. It is based on the idea that collections of preferences can 
cancel each other out and effectively be removed from the analysis.
To start, consider this very special preference profile:
0 B > C > A
0 C > A > B
0 A > B > C
20 To be clear, I am not arguing that the notion of legislative intent is incoherent, 
only that advancing the Condorcet criterion as a way of reclaiming it is incorrect. 
2 Stearns, An Introduction to Social Choice at 92 (cited in note 3).
22 Except, perhaps, for the allowance of log-rolling in legislation. See Dennis C. 
Mueller, Public Choice II 82 (Cambridge 989).
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This profile gives rise to a Condorcet cycle, B > C > A, but this cycle 
has the property that every pairwise vote is numerically exactly the 
same—the winner gets twenty votes and the loser gets ten. So the 
voting outcomes are completely symmetric in the alternatives—
there is no way to distinguish one from another. Given this out-
come, the only reasonable conclusion is that all three alternatives 
are tied.23 If we had to decide a winner we might resort to flipping a 
coin, or some other random tie-breaking rule. Otherwise the alter-
natives are indistinguishable in terms of their support. I will refer 
to situations such as these, where there are equal numbers of voters 
with cyclic preferences which create indistinguishable alternatives, 
as Condorcet components.
The significance of a Condorcet component is that it represents 
a tie among the alternatives. Since all of the alternatives receive ex-
actly the same amount of support we should view them as being 
identical and we have no principled way to decide among them. So, 
if a subset of voters form a Condorcet component, and hence cannot 
decide among the alternatives, then a reasonable approach would be 
to let the rest of the voters’ wishes prevail, if they are able to come 
to a consensus. It is this idea that is at the heart of our example. 
We can now construct examples of preferences where, as a nor-
mative matter, the Condorcet winner is arguably not the “correct” 
winner. Consider the following set of preferences:2 
30 A > B > C 
 A > C > B 
29 B > A > C
0 B > C > A
0 C > A > B 
 C > B > A
23 I am making the assumption that we wish to treat all the voters identically—in 
technical terms the social choice function is anonymous. If we allow some voters to 
have more clout than others, then there may well be a natural unique “winner.”
2 This example is attributed to Condorcet who, ironically, used it to undermine 
the voting method proposed by Borda. See Szpiro, Numbers Rule at 90 (cited in 
note 2). Of course Condorcet approached this example from the position that a Con-
dorcet winner, if it exists, is presumptively the correct choice. More recently Saari 
has used this example to illustrate the difficulties of the Condorcet criterion. See 
Saari, Chaotic Elections! at 7 (cited at note 5). I will follow the presentation of Ba-
linski and Laraki, Majority Judgment at 7 (cited in note 6).
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214 The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
In this collection of preferences, A is the Condorcet winner—A is 
preferred to B by forty-one of the eighty-one voters, and A is pre-
ferred to C by sixty of them. So the Condorcet criterion would assert 
that A should be the social choice.
But let us think about this in another way. These preferences con-
tain the Condorcet component
0 B > C > A 
0 C > A > B 
0 A > B > C
(the last group of ten is a subset of the thirty voters with those pref-
erences.) As we already noted, the result of a Condorcet component 
is that for these thirty voters there is just a tie among all three al-
ternatives. Since from the perspective of these thirty voters there is 
a tie among all the alternatives, we should leave the decision to the 
rest of the voters. So let us remove those thirty votes from consider-
ation.25 There is another Condorcet component that can be removed 
as well:
 A > C > B 
 C > B > A 
 B > A > C
But after removing these 30 + 3 voters whose preferences result in a 
collective tie among the alternatives we are left with the preferences
20 A > B > C 
28 B > A > C
For this set of preferences it is rather clear that B should be the 
winner, since it is preferred over A by a score of 28 to 20 and C is 
clearly the third choice. But remember, it is A, not B, which is the 
Condorcet winner.
In the next section I will show that the phenomenon illustrated 
by this example is inherent to any social choice method that satis-
25 The idea of removing voters from consideration who collectively tied is com-
monplace. In a regular majority vote between two alternatives a couple who would 
vote in opposite ways may mutually agree not to vote since it is easier and would not 
affect the outcome.
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fies the Condorcet criterion. But for now the point to be made is that 
it is not self-evident that a Condorcet winner should always be the 
social choice.
Before moving to that discussion it is worth noting that often 
scholars will advance a practical argument in favor of a Condorcet 
winner. If a Condorcet winner is available but not chosen, then a 
majority coalition exists that will be opposed to the current choice 
and favor the Condorcet winner. Such a situation is inherently un-
stable. It leads, the argument goes, to either a change to the Condor-
cet winner or a disgruntled majority that feels disenfranchised. 
How seriously we should take this concern depends on a num-
ber of things. The first is whether the various legislative procedures 
would allow for the majority to force a vote between the Condorcet 
winner and the currently chosen option. Most legislatures make it 
difficult to reconsider issues, so there may be few opportunities for 
a majority coalition to overturn the original choice.
One might also wonder whether the level of unhappiness of the 
majority, if they are unable to alter the decision, would be sufficient 
to undermine the government. The legislative procedures might be 
sufficiently murky that the majority may be unsure as to the real 
strength of their position. The costs of attempting to overturn the 
decision may be sufficiently high, or the benefits sufficiently dif-
fuse, to make it inefficient even to try to overturn the decision, even 
if they were certain that they were in the majority. 
Another factor in assessing this argument is the question, if this 
kind of instability or majority displeasure truly manifested itself, 
what would we expect to see in situations in which there was no 
Condorcet winner at all? In those cases one would expect to see con-
tinuous cycling of the chosen alternatives and considerable unhap-
piness among the shifting majorities that have lost. But it is, in fact, 
very difficult to identify actual instances of cycling in legislative 
decision making,26 and so the fears of this kind of instability would 
appear to be overblown.
I V .  C O N D O R C E T  W I N N E R S  A N D  
T H E  N O - S H O W  P A R A D O X
In the previous section I gave an example to show that a Condorcet 
winner need not be the presumptive social choice. The basis of the 
26 “Tullock noted that the theory that predicts cyclical majorities stands in sharp 
contrast to reality and asks why stability is observed in legislatures, although insta-
bility is predicted by innumerable chaos theorems.” Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, 
in Dennis C. Mueller, ed, Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook 332 (Cam-
bridge 997).
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argument was that when groups of voters essentially negate each 
other (because they form a Condorcet component) the deciding vot-
ers may prefer an alternative other than the Condorcet winner. In 
this section I will show how this example illustrates an inherent 
problem in methods that always select Condorcet winners.
Before proceeding further, however, it is worth noting that the 
problem illustrated in the previous section extends beyond just the 
normative claim that the Condorcet winner is not the obviously 
correct social choice. It actually can be extended to show that any 
social choice function that is Condorcet consistent can be destabi-
lized by the addition of a Condorcet component, as we now illus-
trate.
A social choice function is said to cancel properly if the social 
choice remains unchanged when the voters are supplemented by 
adding a Condorcet component. That is, if the social choice is alter-
native A for a particular profile, then changing the profile by adding 
a set of voters which forms a Condorcet component will result in 
the same social choice. As an example, suppose a social choice func-
tion selects option A given the profile
8 A > B > C 
2 B > A > C 
5 C > A > B
If the social choice function cancels properly, then A will still be 
the social choice for the profile
8 A > B > C 
0 B > C > A
2 B > A > C
25 C > A> B
because the latter profile differs from the former by the addition of 
the Condorcet component
0 A > B > C
0 B > C > A 
0 C > A > B
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The property of canceling properly is, unfortunately, inconsis-
tent with the Condorcet criterion, as was shown by Balinski and 
Laraki.27 
Theorem: There is no social choice function that is Condorcet 
consistent and cancels properly.
This theorem shows that if a social choice function will always 
select a Condorcet winner, if one is available, then the result might 
be changed by adding voters who form a Condorcet component. 
The reader might think that the argument in favor of canceling 
properly is not compelling. Is that the worst that can happen if we 
require Condorcet consistency? Well, no. There is an inherently re-
lated property that is considerably more problematic, especially in 
the context of legislative decisions. That is the property of join con-
sistency.
Imagine that the House of Representatives has to choose among 
three alternatives A, B, and C for some policy and they are using 
a certain social choice function to do so. Suppose that using that 
function the California delegation would choose alternative C. In 
addition suppose that the rest of the members of the House, using 
the same choice function, would also select C. What should happen 
if the whole House makes a decision? One would naturally assume 
that C should be the choice. That is the property of join consistency: 
If two separate electorates each choose the same alternative, then 
when the two electorates act as one, they should make the same 
choice.
Unfortunately, join consistency is not compatible with Condorcet 
consistency, as this theorem of H. Peyton Young demonstrates:28
Theorem: No social choice function that is Condorcet consis-
tent is also join consistent.
This theorem seriously undermines the desirability of a Condorcet- 
consistent social choice function. A Condorcet-consistent function 
must, necessarily, lead to the following possibility: Suppose both 
the California delegation and the remaining members of the House 
(each deciding separately) prefer alternative C. If the social choice 
function is Condorcet consistent then it is necessarily join incon-
sistent and thus, acting as one, the House might choose alternative 
B instead. This puts the California delegation in an untenable posi-
tion. They could advance their preferences by NOT appearing at the 
vote. This is referred to as a no-show paradox. 
27 Balinski and Laraki, Majority Judgment at 77 (cited in note 6).
28 See id.
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218 The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
An example will help illustrate this. Suppose the method of elec-
tion is to first pair off A against B and then that winner pairs off 
against C. Let group X be the eleven voters with preferences given 
by
3 A > B > C 
3 C > A > B 
5 B > C > A
In this election A beats B 6 to 5 and then C beats A 8 to 5, so the 
group choice is C.
Now suppose another group Y, also with eleven voters, has the 
preferences
5 B > A > C 
 A > C > B 
5 C > B > A
In their election B beats A 0 to  and then C beats B 6 to 5 also 
resulting in C being the choice.
But what happens if X and Y vote together? In that combined vote 
B beats A 5 to 7, but then B also beats C 3 to 9, resulting in B being 
the winner! So while each group separately prefers C in a unified 
vote they choose B.
One might think that the no-show effect is solely of academic con-
cern and unlikely to arise in real life. While I do not have an exam-
ple of it arising in an election employing a Condorcet-consistent 
method (which is what is suggested by the previous theorem), there 
are plausible claims that it manifested itself in a mayoral election in 
Burlington, Vermont, in 2009.29 In a four-candidate race for mayor, 
in an election using instant runoff voting, which is not Condorcet 
consistent,30 the Condorcet winner actually came in third. There 
was a group of voters who ranked the actual winner third, but had 
they not voted at all, their second-ranked candidate would have 
won. So the outcome would have been better for them had they just 
29 See http://www.rangevoting.org/Burlington.html. But compare http://www 
.fairvote.org/more-on-warren-smiths-and-anthony-gierzynskis-flawed-analysis/; 
compare http://www.rangevoting.org/BurlResponses.html. 
30 Instant runoff voting is sometimes called Hare voting. See Taylor, Mathematics 
and Politics at 00 (cited in note ).
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stayed home. Thus, the no-show paradox is one that does actually 
arise, and if the election uses a Condorcet-consistent voting method 
there will always be the concern that it will manifest itself.
As just illustrated, employing a method that is join inconsistent 
could lead to groups not participating in a decision as way to advance 
their own interests. This undermines the goal of participation as a 
key component of deliberative groups. Yet it is a problem inherent 
to social choice functions that always choose a Condorcet winner. 
Thus, as a theoretical matter, methods that are Condorcet consis-
tent are put into question.
The failure of any Condorcet-consistent method to satisfy join-
consistency was previously noted by William Riker.3 He refers to it 
as a “very serious defect” and claims that the problem in fact man-
ifested itself during the time that state legislatures were selecting 
senators.32 He summarizes the issue this way: “Failing consistency, 
then, majoritarian [Condorcet-consistent] methods are at least im-
practical as well, perhaps, as unfair.”33 These serious reservations 
seem to have been missed by a number of authors because he rou-
tinely is cited in support of the position the importance of the Con-
dorcet criterion.3
V .  C O N C L U S I O N
The goal of this Article is to undermine the significance of the Con-
dorcet winner to public choice. Despite its recurring invocation as 
the obvious choice, there are both theoretical and practical reasons 
why we should be skeptical of its importance. Yes, there is a super-
ficial appeal of “majority rule” when advocating for a Condorcet 
winner, but if there is any lesson to be learned from Arrow at all it 
is that superficial appeals rarely withstand scrutiny. There are, alas, 
no self-evident correct alternatives even in the situations where a 
Condorcet winner exists.
3 William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the 
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 02 (Freeman 982). He calls 
the condition “consistency.”
32 Id. I should note that I am not entirely sold on his example, but that is a differ-
ent story. 
33 Id at 05. Later he says, “We should think of the methods, I believe, simply as 
convenient ways of doing business, useful but flawed. This gives them all a place in 
the world, but it makes none of them sacrosanct.” Id at 3.
3 See for, example, Stearns and Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts at 03 (cited in 
note ); Levmore, 72 U Chi L Rev at n 69 (cited in note 6). 
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